By Jonathan Colman
Drawing upon an intensive variety of assets from either side of the Atlantic, this publication presents the 1st full-length examine of the arguable dating among Harold Wilson and Lyndon B. Johnson. whereas Wilson was once an organization supporter of the assumption of a "special courting" among Britain and the USA and desired to use his dealings with the White residence to reinforce his credentials as a global statesman, Johnson held the British chief in low esteem and disdained the belief of a "special" Anglo-American courting. problems stemming from the Vietnam conflict, British financial weak spot and the UK's abrogation of its global energy prestige exacerbated the tension among Wilson and Johnson, resulting in what was once essentially the most bothered of the entire relationships among British leading ministers and American presidents.
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Extra info for A 'special relationship'?: Harold Wilson, Lyndon B. Johnson and Anglo-American relations 'at the summit', 1964-68
In an influential paper, Bundy argued that Johnson should be persuaded to let the MLF ‘sink out of sight … we should now ask the President for authority to work toward a future in which the MLF does not come into existence’. It seemed ‘increasingly clear’, said Bundy, ‘that the costs of success would be prohibitive’. 64 Later, Johnson asked Bundy why Kennedy had been ‘tentative about the MLF’. Bundy responded that ‘there were different reasons at different times, but in the last half of 1963 the reasons were, I think, dominated by his feeling that if he could only get the MLF by major and intense US pressure, it was not worth it’.
29 pm, 25 November 1964. 35 Virginia State Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia (VHS), Diary of David K. E. Bruce, MSS 5:1B8303:50, entry for 25 November 1964. 36 James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Collins, 1987), p. 176. 37 PRO, PREM 13/103, ‘Note for the Record’, 27 November 1964. 38 Richard Crossman, Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, vol. I, Minister of Housing 1964–1966 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1975), p. 117, entry for 3 January 1965. 39 Lord Wigg, George Wigg (London: Michael Joseph, 1972), p.
The approach to the summit 21 The Labour victory President Johnson had never feared a Labour victory in Britain, but he felt it necessary to ease any concern in the world at large (especially in financial markets) about the British ‘socialists’ entering office. Although the news that China had detonated an atomic bomb and that Khrushchev had been ousted from power stole the international headlines in the United States, Johnson affirmed on television that Labour ‘are our friends, as the Conservatives before them are our friends, and as governments of both parties have been our friends for generations’.
A 'special relationship'?: Harold Wilson, Lyndon B. Johnson and Anglo-American relations 'at the summit', 1964-68 by Jonathan Colman